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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
others from entering those areas, or to conceal illegal activities. '94 But
courts seeking guidance on the roles and interplay of notice, discretion,
and constitutional rights in vagueness doctrine will find no similar
succor. Regardless whether the Court would have decided that the
police guidelines cured the ordinance's fatal vagueness had it consid-
ered the regulation more carefully, the Court should have analyzed the
precedential support for, and the logical consequences of, an invalida-
tion due to discretionary vagueness alone. Had the Court done so, it
might have identified a coherent internal logic to the doctrine that
could explain the past and guide the future.
D. Freedom of Speech
Political Speech - Restrictions on Ballot-Initiative Petitions. -
The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that ballot and election
regulations raise difficult questions about the interplay between the
First Amendment's heightened protection for political speech, and
states' need to regulate ballots and elections to ensure fair and orderly
democracy.1 When making the delicate judgments between protecting
political speech and allowing states to regulate elections, the Court has
traditionally stated precisely which test it was employing to evaluate
individual restrictions.' Last Term, in Buckley v. American Constitu-
tional Law Foundation,3 the Court invalidated several of Colorado's
restrictions on the signature-gathering process for ballot initiative peti-
tions. In so doing, the Court failed to identify which level of scrutiny
it was applying for each of the restrictions in question and relied in-
stead on certain unreviewed restrictions to render unconstitutional the
specific regulations before it. The lack of clarity in the resulting opin-
ion will make it difficult for lawmakers, lower courts, and the Court to
create and evaluate election regulations.
In 1993, the American Constitutional Law Foundation (ACLF)
brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado to challenge Colorado's ballot initiative regulations. 4 The
94 Id. at 1864-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 45 U.S. 724, 729-30 (974) ("[There is] no litmus-paper test for
separating those restrictions that are valid from those that are invidious under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. The rule is not self-executing and is no substitute for the hard judgments that must
be made. Decision in this context, as in others, is very much a 'matter of degree' .... (citing
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 348 (1972))); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (i968) (noting
that a decision about the constitutionality of an election regulation involves careful consideration
of "the fact and circumstances behind the law').
2 See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 192,
298 (2992).
3 119 S. Ct. 636 (x999).
4 See id. at 641; American Constitutional Law Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 87o F. Supp. 995 (D.
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ACLF alleged that the following requirements were unconstitutional
restrictions on the freedom of speech: petition circulators must be at
least i8 years old; circulators must be registered voters; circulation
may take place only for six months; circulators must wear badges
showing their names; circulators must attach to each submitted peti-
tion an affidavit stating their names and addresses with statements
that they have read and understand the laws governing the circulation
of petitions; and initiative proponents must disclose at the time of fil-
ing the amount of money paid for gathering signatures, along with the
name, address, county of voter registration, and the amount paid to
each circulator, and must make monthly statements with similar in-
formation throughout the petition circulation period.'
After a bench trial, the district court struck down the badge re-
quirement and portions of the disclosure provisions but upheld the
age, affidavit, and circulation period requirements. 6 Although the dis-
trict court found that the voter registration requirement "limits the
number of persons available to circulate ... and, accordingly, restricts
core political speech," the court upheld the requirement because Colo-
rado voters had passed it as a constitutional amendment, rendering it
"not subject to any level of scrutiny."7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed
in part and reversed in part.8 Although the court agreed that the age,
circulation time, and affidavit requirements were reasonable restric-
tions on the ballot-initiative process, the court struck down the entire
registered voter requirement and parts of the badge and disclosure re-
quirements as unconstitutional encroachments on protected political
expression.9 The Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's suggestion
that the registered voter requirement was not subject to scrutiny be-
cause it was passed by petition and noted that "[t]he voters may no
more violate the United States Constitution by enacting a ballot issue
than the general assembly may by enacting legislation.' 1
The Supreme Court affirmed. Writing for the Court,1 Justice
Ginsburg began by reaffirming the Court's previous holding that peti-
tion circulation is "core political speech" for which First Amendment
Colo. 1994).
5 See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 640-41.
6 See Meyer, 870 F. Supp. at oS.
7 Meyer, 870 F. Supp. at xoo2.
8 See American Constitutional Law Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 12o F.3d 1092 (Ioth Cir. 1997).
9 See Meyer, 12o F.3 d at 1097-1107.
10 Id. at xxoo. The court of appeals found that the registered voter requirement imposed a
severe burden and invalidated it because Colorado could not show "a compelling state interest to
which its registration requirement is narrowly tailored." Id.
11 Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter joined the majority opinion.
1999]
HARVARD LAWREVIEW
protection is "at its zenith."' 2  Nonetheless, Justice Ginsburg recog-
nized that states have considerable leeway in protecting the integrity
and reliability of the ballot initiative process.' 3 She added that there is
no "litmus-paper test" to separate valid restrictions on ballot access
from invalid restrictions on free speech.14
The Court then addressed the. registered voter requirement.' 5 Jus-
tice Ginsburg cited statistical evidence and trial testimony demon-
strating that the requirement limited the number of voices that may
convey an initiative's message.1 6 The Court rejected Colorado's ar-
gument that the ease of registering softens the effect on speech, 7 not-
ing that ease of registration does not lift the burden on speech for those
for whom refusing to register "implicates political thought and expres-
sion."'.8 The Court was similarly unconvinced by Colorado's argument
that. the registered voter requirement was necessary to ensure that cir-
culators were amenable to the secretary of state's subpoena power. 19
The Court found that the state's "strong interest in policing lawbreak-
ers" was already served by the affidavit requirement - upheld below
and not reviewed by the Court - under which circulators must submit
an affidavit attesting to, among other things, their place of residence.20
Next, the Court considered the requirement that petition circulators
wear identification badges displaying their names. The Court found
that the identification badge, by forcing circulators to reveal their iden-
tities in potentially protracted discussions that may invite "intense,
emotional, and unreasoned" reactions,2' burdened the exchange of po-
litical ideas. 22 Colorado argued that the badge "enables the public to
12 Buckley, ii9 S. Ct. at 639-40 (citing Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422, 425 (1988)).
13 See id. at 642.
14 Id. (citation omitted); see supra note i.
15 The Court rejected cross-appeals from the ACLF as to the age, circulation period, and affi-
davit requirements, and therefore limited its analysis to the registered voter, badge, and reporting
requirements. See Buckley, i9 S. Ct. at 642 n.io; see also American Constitutional Law Found.
v. Meyer, 12o F.3 d 1092 (ioth Cir. 1997), cert. denied, i8 S. Ct. 1045 (1998).
16 See Buckley, i19 S. Ct. at 643-44. When the case was before the district court, registered
voters in Colorado numbered approximately 1.9 million; at least 400,000 persons eligible to vote
were not registered. See id. at 643.
17 See id. at 644.
18 Id.
19 See id.
20 Id. at 644-45.
21 Id. at 645 (quoting Meyer, 12o F.3d at 1102) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 In discussing the badge requirement, the Court analogized to its decision in McIntyre v.
Ohio, 514 U.S. 334 (995), in which the Court found a ban on anonymous distribution of cam-
paign literature to be unconstitutional. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 645. The Buckley Court held
that, because the petition circulator engages in an even longer exchange - expressing a desire for
political change and engaging in a discussion of the merits of the proposed change - the badge
requirement presented a greater burden on political speech than the ban found unconstitutional in
McIntyre. See id. at 646.
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identify, and the State to apprehend, petition circulators who engage in
misconduct. ''23 Justice Ginsburg, however, reasoned that the affidavit
requirement "is responsive to the State's concern[s]" because it pro-
vides law enforcers with the circulator's name, address, and signa-
ture. 24 The Court thus found that the badge requirement "discourages
participation ... without sufficient cause. '21
Finally, the Court addressed the disclosure requirements that the
Tenth Circuit had invalidated. The court of appeals had struck down
the requirements of monthly and individual reporting for circulators
and had left only the requirements of reporting the identities of propo-
nents who paid circulators and of reporting the amount the proponents
paid per signature.26 Relying heavily on Buckley v. Valeo, 27 Justice
Ginsburg explained that disclosure provides the electorate with impor-
tant information "as to where political campaign money comes from
and how it is spent. '28 Justice Ginsburg noted that Buckley v. Valeo
nonetheless requires "exacting scrutiny" of campaign-related financial
disclosure requirements.29 The Court then judged the validity of the
month and name reports in the context of those disclosure require-
ments that the lower court had upheld.30 Ultimately, the Court found
that disclosure of sponsors' names and the amount they spent suffi-
ciently served the public interest; any added benefits of monthly re-
ports of names and total pay of individual circulators had "not been
demonstrated. 131
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment. He began by articu-
lating the "now-settled approach" that "severe burdens" on core politi-
cal speech can be tolerated only under a law that is "narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling state interest."32 For less severe burdens, a
state's important regulatory interests usually provide sufficient justifi-
cation. 33 Finding that each of the requirements in question presented
a "severe burden," Justice Thomas argued that the majority should
have evaluated each under strict scrutiny.34 Under this more exacting
standard, Justice Thomas agreed with the Court that Colorado's re-
23 Buckley, r19 S. Ct. at 645.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 646.
26 See id. The Court did not review the Tenth Circuit's approval of these requirements. See
id. at 642 n.io.
27 424 U.S. 1(976).





32 Id. at 649 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
33 See id.
34 Id. at 649.
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strictions violated the First Amendment.3
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment in part and dissented
in part. In an opinion joined by Justice Breyer, Justice O'Connor ar-
gued that some regulations of the ballot initiative process do not di-
rectly burden the communicative aspect of petition circulation and
therefore "should be subject to a less exacting standard of review."36
Because Justice O'Connor found that the badge requirement did im-
pose a severe burden on speech, she invalidated the provision under
the standard of strict scrutiny.37 However, she would have upheld un-
der a reduced level of scrutiny the registered voter and reporting re-
quirements, finding their burdens on speech to be only "indirect[] and
insignificant[]." 38 Justice O'Connor determined that Colorado's legiti-
mate interests in combating fraud and conveying information to the
public were "surely sufficient" to justify the requirements. 39
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented. He argued that states should be
able "to ensure that local issues of state law are decided by local vot-
ers, rather than by out-of-state interests. '40 Chief Justice Rehnquist
challenged the Court's conclusion that the decision not to register "im-
plicates political thought and expression" by arguing that such a rela-
tion to thought and expression is simply untrue for most people.41
Moreover, the Chief Justice argued that restricting petitions to circula-
tion by state residents, American citizens, or adults also "limits the
number of voices available" to convey the initiative proponents' mes-
sage; he worried that the majority's decision would make even basic
residency and citizenship requirements unconstitutional. 42  In closing,
Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed that the badge requirement was uncon-
stitutional, but maintained that the disclosure requirement, which
added only the amount paid to each circulator to the information con-
veyed in the affidavit, was valid.43
Although the outcome of the Court's holdings is clear - that each
of the three regulations is unconstitutional - the opinion provides
lower courts and state legislatures with scant explanation of how the
Court reached these conclusions. The majority's silence about what
level of scrutiny it employed renders the decision unclear for decision-
makers seeking to understand and predict the Court's treatment of
ballot access restrictions. This type of silence from the Court regard-
3s See id. at 653.
36 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
37 See id. at 654.
38 Id. at 655.
39 Id. at 657.
40 Id. at 659 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 66o (quoting Buckley, x 19 S. Ct. at 644) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42 Id. at 661.
43 See id. at 662.
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ing which test should be used would be troubling in any situation; it is
especially disturbing in the ballot access area, which as the Court has
repeatedly noted, involves particularly difficult decisions. This prob-
lem is complicated by the fact that the opinion, although vague con-
cerning the standard of scrutiny, is precise in its reliance on existing
yet unscrutinized regulations to render the rules in question unconsti-
tutional. Oddly, the Court ultimately relied upon the regulations it
chose not to review in order to invalidate those it did review. Together,
the Court's silence about what standard it employed and its reliance
on unscrutinized regulations render the opinion unlikely to provide
lawmakers with any useful guidance.
The majority's silence regarding the level of scrutiny being applied
represents a marked and unsettling departure from past practice. As
the Court has repeatedly recognized in ballot access cases,
"[r]egulations imposing severe burdens .. .must be narrowly tailored
and advance a compelling state interest."44 In comparison, "[1]esser
burdens ... trigger less exacting review, and a State's important regu-
latory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondis-
criminatory restrictions. ''45 Although the Court has noted that no clear
line separates permissible from impermissible regulations, it has in the
past stated clearly which level of scrutiny it was applying. For exam-
ple, in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,46 the Court found that
the burdens imposed by banning fusion candidates "though not triv-
ial[,] are not severe."4' Because the burdens were less than severe, the
Court did not look for a narrowly tailored and compelling justifica-
tion.48  Similarly, in Burdick v. Takushi,49 the Court explicitly found
that a Hawaii election law imposed "only a limited burden" and there-
fore "the State need not establish a compelling interest to tip the con-
stitutional scales in its direction."50 In contrast, in cases such as Bur-
44 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) (quoting Burdick v. Ta-
kushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
45 Id. at 358.
' 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
47 Id. at 363. Fusion candidates are candidates who are nominated by more than one political
party for the same office in the same general election. See id. at 353 n.i.
48 See id. at 364.
49 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
SO Id. at 439. The Court provided a helpful summary of the weighing that should be con-
ducted in such situations:
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh "the character and
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate" against "the precise interests put for-
ward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule," taking into con-
sideration "the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's
rights."
Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 46o U.S. 78o, 789 (x983)).
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son v. Freeman,5 1 Meyer v. Grant,52 and Williams v. Rhodes,5 3 the
Court clearly stated that the burden was severe enough to merit
stricter scrutiny and explicitly required a "compelling interest" to jus-
tify the law.5
4
Although the majority made a point of responding to Justice Tho-
mas's opinion by adopting the words of strict scrutiny in a footnote,' s
the text of the opinion itself nowhere evaluates the restrictions in such
terms. In fact, the majority conducted no explicit inquiry whether
Colorado's interests rose to the level of being "compelling" or whether
the restrictions at issue were "narrowly tailored" to serve those inter-
ests. Rather, for each of the three restrictions considered, the Court,
after finding a burden - which it did not explicitly classify as either
minor or severe - moved directly to considering whether the con-
tested regulations were necessary in light of the unreviewed regula-
tions.5 6 At no point did the majority articulate the standard against
which the state interest was measured.-7 Rather than adopting terms
51 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
52 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
53 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
54 See Burson, 504 U.S. at 198 (requiring the state to demonstrate that the "regulation is neces-
sary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end" (quot-
ing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 469 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Meyer, 486 U.S. at 425 (deeming the state's burden under strict scrutiny "well-
nigh insurmountable'); Williams, 393 U.S. at 31 (finding that the burden on voting rights could
only be justified by "a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's
constitutional power to regulate" (quoting NAACP v. Button, 37, U.S. 415, 438 (1963)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
55 See Buckley, I19 S. Ct. at 642 n.12. Cryptically, the Court stated: "Our decision is entirely
in keeping with the 'now-settled approach' that state regulations 'impos[ing] severe burdens on
speech ... [must] be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."' Id. (quoting id. at
649 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)). However, this statement, like the rest of the opin-
ion, does not indicate which of the regulations at issue, if any, impose severe burdens and conse-
quently must be justified by narrowly tailored rules that serve compelling interests. By merely
restating the rule, without explicitly stating when, whether, or how it is to be applied, the Court
did little to clarify its holding.
56 See id. at 644-46, 647.
57 Although the Court was silent about the standard used for the registered voter and badge
requirements, it did repeat the Tenth Circuit's use of the phrase "exacting scrutiny" at one point
when evaluating the disclosure requirements. Id. at 648 (quoting American Constitutional Law
Found. v. Meyer, 120 F 3d 1092, 1105 (ioth Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court did not, however, explicitly adopt the Tenth Circuit's standard in its analysis. Further-
more, the majority did not explain what level of state interest satisfies "exacting scrutiny," a stan-
dard that has been unsettled in meaning ever since its first articulation in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. i, 64-65 (1976), and used in several cases with seemingly different meanings. In Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, i98 (1992), for example, "exacting scrutiny" and "strict scrutiny" were
used as synonyms. In other cases, however, "exacting scrutiny" seems to require something other
than a narrowly tailored rule serving a compelling state interest. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (requiring an "overriding" state interest); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. at 64 (discussing how "substantial relation" or "relevant correlation" between the law and the
governmental interest is needed to satisfy "exacting scrutiny").
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generally associated with strict scrutiny or any other well-established
standard, the Court used the nebulous terms "without impelling cause"
(registration requirement),8 "without sufficient cause" (badge require-
ment),5 9 and "no more than tenuously related to the substantial inter-
ests" (disclosure provisions).6 0
The Court's silence as to which standard it employed may be due
to the peculiar composition of the majority - Justices Stevens, Ken-
nedy, Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg. Aside from the unanimous opinion
in Meyer v. Grant,61 most of the recent cases cited in Buckley have
evinced sharp disagreements among these five Justices in judging the
severity of burdens and the applicability of different levels of scrutiny.
In Timmons, for example, Justices Kennedy and Scalia found the bur-
den imposed by a ban on fusion candidates to be "not severe," and
thus applied lesser scrutiny,62 while Justices Stevens, Souter, and Gins-
burg found the burden to be "intolerable" and demanded a "corre-
spondingly heavy burden of justification if the law is to survive judi-
cial scrutiny."63 In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,64 four of
the five believed the burden of a ban on anonymous distribution of
campaign literature to be significant enough to demand "exacting scru-
tiny" to determine the law was "narrowly tailored to serve an overrid-
ing state interest,"65 but Justice Scalia found the law to present "virtu-
ally no imposition at all" and mocked the Court's holding, proclaiming
that "it may take decades" to clarify the majority's rule.6 6 In Burdick,
Justices Scalia and Souter found that a ban on write-in voting "im-
pose[d] only a limited burden" (and thus required lesser scrutiny),67
while Justice Stevens joined Justice Kennedy in a dissent that refused
to specify a level of scrutiny but deemed the law unconstitutional un-
der any standard.6 8 Finally, in Burson, the Buckley majority was
splintered into three different camps over a law that prohibited cam-
paigning within ioo feet of the entrance to a polling place. Justice
Kennedy joined a plurality of the Court to proclaim that the restriction
must and does survive "strict scrutiny, '69 Justice Scalia concurred in
58 Buckley, i1 9 S. Ct. at 645.
59 Id. at 646.
60 Id. at 648.
61 486 U.S. 414 (1988) (finding that Colorado's ban on paying petition circulators was uncon-
stitutional).
62 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 363 (1997).
63 Id. at 374 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64 514 U.S. 334 (i995).
6 Id. at 347.
66 Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439 (1992).
68 See id. at 448 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
69 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. ii, 199 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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the judgment but found the application of the plurality's standard "in-
appropriate," 70 and Justices Stevens and Souter dissented, believing
that strict scrutiny was required but not satisfied.71 In short, the five
justices in the Buckley majority have historically exhibited an inability
to agree on the severity of burdens or acceptability of state interests.
Given this history, the emergence of this particular set of Justices in
a majority opinion that states a conclusion without establishing a
standard raises the question whether they agreed on a single standard
at all. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the majority opinion left even other
Justices on the Supreme Court without a clear understanding of the
majority's position. Justice O'Connor wrote a partial concurrence and
dissent, in which Justice Breyer joined, to argue that two of the three
regulations should not have been subject to strict scrutiny and were
constitutional because they survived lesser scrutiny.72 Both Justices
clearly believed that the majority evaluated at least one of the regula-
tions under a strict scrutiny test.73 Justice Thomas, on the other hand,
wrote his concurrence for precisely the opposite reason: although he
agreed with the majority's conclusion that all three restrictions were
unconstitutional, he wrote solely to protest the majority's failure to
employ strict scrutiny.74
Even if the Court had been clearer about which tests it was ap-
plying, the majority opinion would still be hampered by another, sub-
tler problem. Regardless which standard the Court adopted, the
opinion demonstrates a strange reliance on restrictions that the Court
decided not to review to fuel its analysis. In the case of each validat-
ing restriction, the Court found the asserted state interest already
served by an unreviewed law and - seemingly on this basis alone -
deemed additional requirements unconstitutional.
In evaluating the voter registration requirement, for example, the
Court rejected Colorado's interest in policing lawbreakers because that
interest was already served by the requirement that circulators submit
an affidavit attesting to, among other things, their names and ad-
70 See id. at 214 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
71 See id. at 2,7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72 See Buckley, i1 9 S. Ct. at 653 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part).
73 See id. at 654 ("I agree with the Court that requiring petition circulators to wear identi-
fication badges ... should be subject to, and fails, strict scrutiny."). Furthermore, the general
emphasis on the notion that not all regulations should receive the same scrutiny implies that Jus-
tices O'Connor and Breyer believed that the majority applied strict scrutiny to all the regulations.
See id. at 654-57.
74 See id. at 649 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The Court today appears to depart
from this now settled approach (that laws imposing severe burdens be subject to strict scrutiny].
In my view, Colorado's badge, registration, and reporting requirements each must be evaluated
under strict scrutiny.").
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dresses.75 Similarly, the Court found that the badge requirement was
unconstitutional because the affidavit requirement "is responsive to the
State's concern" about identifying and apprehending circulators who
engage in misconduct. 76 Finally, the Court found that the monthly
disclosure requirements and naming of circulators were unnecessary
because other reporting requirements, upheld below but not reviewed
by the Court, satisfied the State's interest in informing voters. 77
The Court's reliance on the affidavit and disclosure requirements is
surprising. Both requirements were upheld below, but the Court re-
jected a petition that would have allowed it to scrutinize and affirm
those regulations. 78  On the one hand, the Court made a point of re-
sponding to Justice Thomas's call for strict scrutiny in all cases by at
least implying that it might be using strict scrutiny,79 a test it described
in an earlier petition case as "well-nigh insurmountable. '80 On the
other hand, the Court relied almost exclusively on restrictions that it
had not scrutinized at all. If laws that burden the free speech of initia-
tive petition circulators are to be reviewed with strict scrutiny, then the
Court should be very hesitant to rest its decisions on restrictions it has
not scrutinized. The Court's reliance on these unscrutinized restric-
tions is even stranger given the fact that it had the opportunity to re-
view them as part of the same case but chose not to do so.81 The
Court thus confusingly deemed some restrictions to be unworthy of its
consideration but at the same time so important that they justified its
conclusion that a given state interest did not justify the restrictions
deemed worthy of review.
Not only does this reasoning give the Court's opinion the appear-
ance of lacking a real foundation, it also makes the opinion even less
helpful for lawmakers seeking guidance in the future. Because the
Court's justification for rejecting a given regulation is that the gov-
ernmental interest is served in some other way, the opinion presents an
75 See Buckley, x19 S. Ct. at 644 ("The interest in reaching law violators, however, is served by
the requirement, upheld below, that each circulator submit an affidavit setting out, among several
particulars, the address at which he or she resides, including the street name and number, the city
or town, [and] the country." (alteration in original) (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-111(2)
(x998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
76 id. at 645.
77 See id. at 647.
78 See id. at 642 no.
79 See id. at 642 n.12. But see supra note 57 (distinguishing the Court's approach from
strict scrutiny).
80 Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988).
81 See Buckley, i19 S. Ct. at 642 n.xo (rejecting the opportunity to review the remaining age,
affidavit, and disclosure requirements). The Court did state at one point that "the Tenth Circuit
correctly separated necessary or proper ballot-access controls from restrictions that unjustifiably
inhibit" free speech, id. at 649, but such conclusory statements about regulations not before the
Court hardly constitutes the type of constitutional analysis required to balance sensitive interests.
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indeterminate circular logic. The badge and registration requirements
were held unnecessary because the affidavit requirement exists, and
the Court treated that unreviewed requirement as constitutional. But
if the affidavit requirement had been reviewed first, with the presump-
tion that the registration and badge requirements were constitutional,
then the affidavit requirement might have seemed duplicative and
been rejected. Similarly, the Court used one part of the disclosure re-
quirement to invalidate other parts. Lawmakers are thus left to guess
in which order the Court will review restrictions or which ones it will
treat as presumptively constitutional and part of the statutory back-
ground in evaluating others.
As a result of both the Court's silence regarding what standard it
employed and its awkward reliance on the constitutionality of provi-
sions it could have explicitly upheld but chose not to review, the Court
crafted an opinion that is unlikely to help future decisionmakers. If
the Justices in the majority agreed on a single standard, then they
should have stated it explicitly. If all five agreed on the outcome and
not on the standard, then at least one of them should have explained
the disagreement. The majority's chosen course - silence - leaves
lawmakers, commentators, and even fellow members of the Court un-
certain about how to evaluate the constitutionality of state regulations
of the democratic process.
E. Seventh Amendment
Section 1983 - Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial. - In
,871, Representative Lowe described a nation in which "whip-
pings and lynchings and banishment have been visited upon unof-
fending American citizens, [while] local administrations have been
found inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective."' Sec-
tion i of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, was "meant to protect and defend and give remedies for their
wrongs to all the people ' 2 and permits parties who feel that they have
been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek re-
lief in federal court.3 Because § 1983 was designed to provide a broad
1 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., ist Sess. 374 (1871) (statement of Rep. Lowe).
2 Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 684 (1978) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 4 2d
Cong., ist Sess., app. 68 (1871) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger)).
3 Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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